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1 Introduction
It is well-known that often different kinds of consequence relations are defined
for reasoning from (possibly) inconsistent information. This holds true, for in-
stance, for the consequence relations that are characterized in terms of maximal
consistent subsets. The strong consequences are those formulas that follow by
Classical Logic (CL) from every maximal consistent subset of the premises (in
[18] these consequences are called inevitable consequences, elsewhere they are
sometimes called universal consequences). The weak consequences (sometimes
called existential consequences) follow by CL from some maximal consistent
subset of the premises. The free consequences follow from the set of formulas
that belong to every maximal consistent subset of the premises.1
Analogous distinctions can be found in default logics (and in logics that
are defined in terms of them—such as some deontic logics, see for instance [8],
and the signed systems from [4]). The sceptical consequences are analogous to
the strong consequences (they follow from every extension) and the credulous
consequences are analogous to the weak consequences (they follow from some
extension). The prudent consequences from [4] are analogous to the free conse-
quences (they follow from the set of formulas that belong to every extension).
In Input/Output logics (see, for instance, [13]), we have the same distinction
under the names “full meet constrained output” and “full join constrained
output”. Finally, we find this approach also in the context of argumentation
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1In [3], the free consequences are defined as follows: where a free premise is one that does
not belong to any minimal inconsistent subset of the premise set, the free consequences are all
formulas that follow from the free premises. There, it has been shown that both definitions
are equivalent since the premises that belong to every consistent subset are exactly the free
premises.
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frameworks (see, for instance, [5]) where credulously accepted arguments are
in some extensions of a given framework, and sceptically accepted arguments
are in all extensions.2
Also for adaptive logics (which provide a unifying framework for all kinds of
defeasible reasoning) different kinds of consequence relations are defined. This
is done by varying the so-called adaptive strategy.
In recent years, many of the above consequence relations were characterized
as adaptive logics. This not only offers a unified framework for these conse-
quence relations, but also provides them with the same kind of semantics and
the same kind of (dynamic) proof theory (and generic proofs for all important
meta-theoretic properties). The strong consequences (and the sceptical conse-
quences) as well as the free consequences (and the prudent consequences) can
be reconstructed by means of the two ‘standard’ adaptive strategies (namely,
Minimal Abnormality for strong/sceptical and Reliability for free/prudent).
For the weak consequences, a new kind of adaptive strategy had to be designed
(which is now called the Normal Selections strategy).
Up to now, adaptive logicians paid relatively little attention to the Normal
Selections strategy (except for reconstructing and integrating existing conse-
quence relations into the adaptive logic framework). Like some others, adap-
tive logicians have always been rather suspicious about the usefulness of the
weak/credulous consequences.
The aim of the present paper is twofold. First, we want to address the
concerns that some people have expressed with respect to the usefulness of the
weak/credulous consequences. Next, we shall argue that, as a ‘reasoning style’,
making weak/credulous inferences is sensible (for some application contexts),
provided one has a (dynamic) proof theory for the corresponding consequence
relation. Such a dynamic proof theory is exactly what adaptive logics offer.
Finally, we shall illustrate all this by means of a very simple reconstruction of
the free, strong, and weak consequences. We shall use the term Rescher-Manor
consequences or RM-consequences when referring to all of them.
A characterization of the RM-consequence relations in terms of adaptive
logics was first presented in [1]. That characterization relies on a paraconsis-
tent logic and a translation of the premises in terms of both a classical and a
paraconsistent negation. The present reconstruction proceeds entirely in terms
of CL.3
The adaptive logics presented here are based on an ‘extension’ of CL, called
CL◦. The logic CL◦ is obtained by adding the connective ◦ to the language
schema of CL. As will become clear below, ◦ functions as a ‘block connective’
in CL◦: from the truth or falsehood of ◦A nothing follows about the truth or
falsehood of A. Because of this, ◦A functions as a ‘block’: it can be combined
(by the usual formation rules) with other formulas, but not even replacement
2Our list is not exhaustive. We have a similar distinction in inheritance networks. How-
ever, there the sceptical consequences are presented as an alternative procedural approach to
the one that results from intersecting the credulous extensions (see, for instance, [9] for de-
tails). In the context of both, inheritance networks and instantiated abstract argumentation,
it is possible to distinguish between arguments that lie in the intersection of all extensions,
and claims or formulas that can be derived from every extension (see, for instance, [9, 17]).
3For an introduction to adaptive logics, see, for instance [2].
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of equivalents is valid within the scope of ◦. For instance, from {◦(p ∧ q), ◦r},
◦(p ∧ q) ∧ ◦r is CL◦-derivable, but ◦(q ∧ p) is not.
The idea behind the reconstruction is extremely simple. First, the orig-
inal premise set is translated by putting the unary connective ◦ in front of
each premise. Next, the original premise set is restored ‘as much as possible’.
What this comes to is that in the adaptive logics A is “as much as possible”
inferred from ◦A. It is precisely this property that allows for a very natural
reconstruction of the RM-consequence relations. Depending on the adaptive
strategy, one obtains a different interpretation of “as much as possible” (this
will become clear below).
The adaptive logics will be presented in Sections 4–6, but first we address
the question which style of reasoning is best suited for which context (Section
2) and the concerns regarding the weak/credulous consequences (Section 3).
2 Different Reasoning Styles for Different Con-
texts
Ever since the idea originated to approach inconsistent theories in terms of
‘extensions’ of some kind (maximal consistent subsets or extensions of a default
theory), there has been the question how the consequences should be defined
in case there are multiple extensions.
In a recent book, Horty claims that this “question is vexed, and has not
been adequately addressed” ([8, p. 35]). Like Horty, we shall not attempt to
solve the problem here, but only point out a number of things.
We shall distinguish between four different options. The first one is the
free/prudent option. This is one of the standard options in the RM-approach,
but has been given relatively little attention outside that approach. The pru-
dent consequence relation from [4] is the only analogue that we could find.
The free/prudent consequences are the ‘innocent bystanders’: they are in
no way related to the inconsistencies, and hence, even in situations in which
the inconsistencies have not yet been resolved, they can safely be accepted.
Obviously, the set of free/prudent consequence is always consistent.
The latter also holds for the strong/sceptical consequences. Makinson, see
[11, p. 38], also uses the term “conservative” for this option. It is typical of
strong/sceptical reasoners that they refuse to draw conclusions in ambiguous
situations (see, for instance, [15] and [21]). For instance, in the Nixon Diamond
a sceptical reasoner will neither conclude that Nixon is a pacifist nor that he is
not a pacifist.
The thirth and fourth options are the weak/credulous option and the choice
option. For the first of these, Makinson also uses the terms “liberal” and
“brave”, see [11, p. 38]. It seems to us that these two categories are sometimes
conflated in the literature and that at least part of the criticism against the
weak/credulous option is related to this. We shall immediately come back to
this.
The idea behind the weak/credulous option is to conclude as much as pos-
sible from an inconsistent theory (see, for instance, [21]). Thus, in the Nixon
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Diamond, one both concludes that Nixon is a pacifist and that he is not. Ac-
cording to the choice option, one simply chooses between different outcomes.
For instance, one may decide to accept that Nixon is a pacifist, even when
clear grounds are missing to give priority to this conclusion, rather than to its
opposite.
As to the question which of these options is best suited for which reasoning
context, there is no agreement. The opinions on the strong/sceptical option
seem to be best in line with one another. Several authors point out that this
option has some clear advantages: it leads to a consistent set of consequences,
it is easy, and it is intuitively appealing (for instance, the idea that one should
withhold belief in cases where one is dealing with conflicting information).
As for the choice option and the weak/credulous option, matters seem less
clear. Some authors, such as Pollock, dismiss credulous reasoning as “just
wrong”. He defends this idea by means of the following example:
Suppose you have two friends, Smith and Jones, whom you regard
as equally reliable. Smith approaches you in the hall and says, “It
is raining outside.” John then announces, “Don’t believe him. It
is a fine sunny day.” If you have no other evidence regarding the
weather, what should you believe? It seems obvious that you should
withhold belief, believing neither that it is raining nor that it is not.
If you were to announce, “I realize that I have no better reason for
thinking that it is raining than for thinking that it is not, but I
choose to believe that it is raining”, no one would regard you as
rational.” ([15, p. 63])
In our view, this is not an example of credulous reasoning (where you keep
an open mind for both options), but an example of the choice option (where,
without good reasons, you just ‘jump’ to one of the conclusions). We would
also agree that for this specific (epistemic) question (“Is it raining or not?”),
the choice option does not seem justified.
Pollock continues by pointing out that credulous reasoning has sometimes
been defended for practical reasoning, on the grounds that, in making practical
decisions, it is sometimes better to act than not to act. With an example from
Pollock: if a group wants to organise a picnic and the two possible sites are
incomparable, then it seems rational to choose at random. However, Pollock
immediately adds an example to show that at random choosing is not justified
in every situation in which some practical decisions have to be made. In the
words of Pollock:
If the agent is performing medical diagnosis and the evidence fa-
voring two diseases is tied, we do not want the agent to decide
randomly to treat the patient for one disease rather than the other.
It could happen that the diseases are not serious if left untreated,
but if the patient is treated for the wrong disease, that treatment
will gravely exacerbate his condition. In such a case we want the
agent to reserve judgment on the matter and not proceed blindly.
([15, p. 63])
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In our view, Pollock’s three examples differ in important respects. The first
example concerns a purely epistemic context (the agent wants an answer to
the question whether or not it is raining). The second example seems to con-
cern an application context that is mainly (or even purely) practical (and in
which, moreover, no harm can be done by acting rather than not acting). The
third example seems to involve both epistemic aspects and practical aspects.
Treating the patient in a justified way also means that one should at least try
to obtain the best possible insight in the underlying causes. This in turn may
require that one investigates the different alternatives and their different out-
comes. In our view, this purpose is best served by the weak/credulous option
(for which we ourselves prefer the term “explorative”).
If we understand him well, the idea that some reasoning contexts involve
both epistemic aspects and practical aspects can also be found in Prakken’s
[16]. Prakken uses the following example. Some university lecturer, John,
wants to finish a paper by Friday, but also promised to give a lecture in some
remote town Faraway. As far as John believes, there are only two ways to get
to Faraway: by car or by bus. In either case, he will not be able to finish the
paper by Friday (he always becomes sick when reading or writing on a bus).
So, he is dealing with a conflict between a desire and a promise. As John sees
no reason to prefer either his desire to his promise or his promise to his desire,
it is, according to Prakken, rational for John to choose randomly whether he
will fulfill his desire or keep his promise. Again according to Prakken, this
reasoning should be formalized as credulous reasoning.
Also here, our analysis would be that we are dealing with the choice option
rather than with credulous reasoning. For us, this example is similar to the
picnic example. There are two (incompatible) goals, there seems to be no
rational ground for choosing between them, and realizing one of the goals is
better than doing nothing. So, in this case (if the possible actions are indeed
indifferent in all respects), we have no problem with the choice option.
Prakken then goes on to elaborate on the example. Suppose that John’s
friend Bob informs him that there is also a train to Faraway, which would give
him the option to work on the paper and still give the lecture. However, John’s
other friend Mary warns him that there will be a strike on Friday, and that
there will be no trains to Faraway, which is denied by Bob. So, before John
sets the goal to take the train, he should first find out whether or not there
will be a train. If John has no reason to trust one friend more than the other,
he should, according to Prakken, reason in a sceptical way, and not act on the
credulous belief that there will be a train to Faraway on Friday. Prakken draws
the following conclusion from the example:
The kind of rationality that is assumed here is that a rational
agent should map out all credulously acceptable action alternatives
that have sceptically acceptable epistemic support and then make
a choice between them. ([16, p. 312])
A similar defence for the use of credulous reasoning in mapping out the different
alternatives can also be found at the end of Prakken’s paper:
5
[I]n some contexts all reasoning can best be credulous while in other
contexts epistemic reasoning can better be sceptical (it makes less
sense to make all reasoning sceptical, since practical reasoning in-
evitably involves choice and a logic for such reasoning should reveal
the alternatives). ([16, p. 321])
Also in [21, p. 478] a similar advantage is pointed out for the credulous ap-
proach: this approach enables one to generate all possible extensions, after
which they can be examined for interesting properties.
Let us now try to summarize our own position on this matter in three
points. The first is that the choice option and the credulous option should not
be identified. In our view, much of the criticism against the credulous option
is precisely related to this conflation.
Our second point is that credulous reasoning (or explorative reasoning as
we prefer to call it), can be useful in many situations where one is dealing with
conflicting information. One of the reasons for this is that, in real life examples,
it is seldom the case that different options are equal in all respects and that
we decide about them by flipping a coin. In Prakken’s example, for instance,
going to Faraway may be a rare chance to meet with some colleagues and to talk
about a joint project. And, normally several other interests and consequences
of our actions will be involved. The most rational way to proceed in cases like
this is to weigh the different pros and cons and to try to design some priority
ordering. However, before one is able to do this, one needs to know what the
different options and their expected outcomes are. In order to find that out,
one will have to reason from the information one has. Explorative reasoning
seems to be best suited here.
Our third point is that it is not evident to link the sceptical/credulous dis-
tinction to the epistemic/practical distinction. As far as we see it, explorative
reasoning occurs in purely epistemic contexts, in purely practical contexts and
also in ‘mixed’ contexts. We also believe that all kinds of pragmatic factors
may influence one’s reasoning strategy.4 Let us try to illustrate this with some
examples.
Suppose you are a pilot in a plane that is in trouble (for instance, you
obtain conflicting information from some of your instruments). If you are not
already at the stage that immediate actions are needed to prevent the plane
from crashing, it may be wise to do some really quick thinking and to explore
the different possibilities before acting. However, if you are unsuccessful in
ruling out the competing explanations (in such a way that only one remains),
you will at some point have to switch to the choice mode. (We assume here
that not acting definitely will lead to a crash.) This is typically a context where
one has a complex interaction between epistemic aspects and practical aspects
(in order to decide on the best possible actions, you need good hypotheses on
4In the context of inheritance networks Horty seems to point out to one particular prag-
matic consideration that sometimes plays a role. According to Horty, the credulous “option
seems appropriate for situations in which the value of drawing conclusions is high relative
to the costs involved if some of those conclusions turn out not to be correct”, while “when
the cost of error rises [. . . ] an ideal reasoner’s conclusion set [. . . ] should be determined,
somehow, by the intersection of these extensions.” ([9, p. 123]).
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what causes the conflicting readings) and where also other factors come into
play (for instance, that at some point you are running out of time).
Compare this with investigators who have to find out what caused a plane
to crash. In this case, all that matters is that one finds the true (or most likely)
cause so that similar crashes can be avoided in the future. In the meantime,
it is harmless that different people start exploring different paths (or even the
same person at different moments in time). A similar situation can be found
when scientists are trying to find an explanation for some hitherto unexplained
phenomenon. In these cases, there may also be some time pressure (reports
and papers are often due for a certain date), but it will not have the same
impact as in the example from the previous paragraph. What matters here is
that one finds the true (or most likely) explanation and this is best served by a
period of exploratory reasoning. So, what we seem to have here are examples
of epistemic contexts, where, at least for part of the reasoning involved, one
best opts for an explorative reasoning style.
As was pointed out in the introduction, the same three kinds of consequence
relations keep reappearing in the literature. By lack of better terms (and so
as not to associate ourselves with one of the existing paradigms), we choose
“safe”, “cautious” and “explorative” for the three reasoning styles.
In the case of the RM-consequence relations, the safe consequences are the
free consequences. As they are not related to the inconsistencies, they can
safely be relied upon. For instance, no matter what causes the plane to crash,
it is safe to instruct the passengers about the appropriate safety instructions.
The strong consequences correspond to the cautious reasoning style. Sup-
pose that our university professor at some point decides to give the lecture,
but that he is still uncertain whether there will be a strike or not. Suppose
moreover that he decides that he will go by bus, if there is a strike. As it
happens, there is only one bus, arriving at 1pm in Faraway, and only one train,
arriving at 10am. At this point, he may want to inform his host that he will in
any case be coming and that he will arrive either at 10am or at 1pm (so that
his host can start making the necessary arrangements for the lecture, taking
into account both scenarios until he has a definite answer).5
What we dub the “explorative style” is typical of situations where there is
no time pressure and where there is no immediate need to take precautionary
measures, but where, for instance, one tries to find out what is the truth of
the matter. This is also why we choose a term that does not have the negative
connotations that “weak” and “credulous” have.
5The conclusion that he will come either at 10am or 1pm is a so-called floating conclusion.
A floating conclusion can be reached by means of two conflicting arguments. In this case,
we have the argument that leads to the claim that he arrives at 10am and the conflicting
argument that leads to the claim that he arrives at 1pm. From both we can derive that he
arrives either at 10am or at 1pm. There is a vivid debate concerning the question whether
and when floating conclusions should be accepted (see [7, 10, 12]). In [19] the notion of
floating conclusions has been linked to the strategies of adaptive logics: according to the
minimal abnormality strategy they are accepted, while according to the reliability strategy
they are rejected.
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3 Weak Consequences versus Explorative Infer-
ences
In the previous section, we tried to make a case that, in some situations, reason-
ing in accordance with the weak/credulous consequences can by useful. Still,
many readers may have doubts. In this section, we shall consider some of the
concerns that have been raised against the motivation and the rational use of
the weak consequences.
If one considers the set of weak consequences, it seems unavoidable to con-
clude that, in most cases, it is just a terrible loss of information. Let us give
an example. Suppose one starts from the following premises:
P1 K
P2 L
P3 ¬(K ∧ L)
P4 (K ≡ R) ∧ ¬L
P5 (L ≡ S) ∧ ¬K
In this case, there are four different maximal consistent subsets:
MCS1 {¬(K ∧ L),K, (K ≡ R) ∧ ¬L}
MCS2 {¬(K ∧ L), L, (L ≡ S) ∧ ¬K}
MCS3 {K,L}
MCS4 {¬(K ∧ L), (K ≡ R) ∧ ¬L, (L ≡ S) ∧ ¬K}
Hence, the weak consequences of the premises are the members of the following
set:
∆ = Cn({K,¬L,R})∪Cn({¬K,L, S})∪Cn({K,L})∪Cn({¬K,¬L,¬R,¬S})
This set of consequences is not closed under any reasonable logic, and so is def-
initely not useful as a stand-alone theory. But does it filter useful information
out of the inconsistent premises? Well, arguably it does not. The inconsisten-
cies have spread so widely, that all implicational information from the original
premises seems to be lost. For instance, K ⊃ R, which follows from the fourth
premise, is a member of ∆, but so are K ⊃ ¬R, R ⊃ K and R ⊃ ¬K.
One could see the set of weak consequences as a collection of suggestions
for hypotheses for further research. However, as the set is per definition infi-
nite, one would need an extra filtering mechanism for every practical purpose.
Moreover, if one finds out that one of the consequences does not hold true,
there is no way to use this new result for further reasoning when starting from
the members of ∆. Suppose, for example, one finds out convincingly that L
is not the case. We may conclude that we should give up on L. Should we
then also give up on L ∨ R or S ∨ L? The set of weak consequences by itself
does not give us any clue on how to proceed in such cases. Hence, if one is
concerned with extracting useful information from inconsistent premises, the
weak consequences do not seem the best option around.
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But suppose that you find yourself in the following situation. You are a
member of some committee that has to select two candidates for two open po-
sitions. Suppose further that after some discussion the committee agreed to
narrow down the number of potential candidates up to four: Kaleb, Lauren,
Rose and Stephen. Now let K stand for “Kaleb should get one of the posi-
tions”, and analogously for the other letters occurring in the premises (and
the corresponding names). You yourself have a clear preference for hiring both
Rose and Stephen. However, your favourite strategy in such cases is to listen
first to the arguments of the others and to try to figure out in which direction
the discussion is going, before you start entering the debate yourself.
It is easily imaginable that you are confronted with the following situation.
Two participants in the debate, P1 and P2, make a strong case in favour of,
respectively, Kaleb and Lauren. A third participant P3 does not (as yet) express
any clear preferences about Rose and Stephen, but definitely does not want that
both Kaleb and Lauren are selected (because, for instance, P3 suspects that
their characters are incompatible and that they might fight all the time when
they become members of the same group). A fourth participant P4 definitely
does not want Lauren to get the job, but P4 also makes it clear that Kaleb
should be hired if and only if also Rose is hired (for instance, P4 agrees with
P1 that K would be a very good candidate, but also believes that Kaleb lacks
certain skills and that, of the three others, Rose is the most compatible with
him). Finally, P5 does not like Kaleb, but also argues that Lauren should be
hired if and only if Stephen is hired.
If you yourself want to make a strong case in favour of hiring both Rose
and Stephen, it might be wise to try to figure out first which participants have
compatible views and which have not (for instance, because you know from
experience that, in some cases, “compatible subgroups” start supporting each
other in an attempt to direct the discussion in a certain way). But, in order
to figure this out, you will have to reason from their statements. What this
comes to is that you will have to make inferences from the premises, in such a
way that you not only avoid the derivation of trivial conclusions, but also that
you are able to detect, for instance, which statements are jointly compatible.
In Section 7, we shall show that a dynamic proof theory is a useful tool
to explicate this kind of explorative reasoning. Hopefully, it will also become
clear that knowing about this kind of proofs and how they work may make
one a better reasoner and a better debater. But, first we have to present the
adaptive logics.
4 Adaptive Logics for the RM-Consequences
Although the original RM-consequence relations were defined in [18] at the
propositional level, we shall extend them to the predicative level. Let MCS(Γ)
stand for the set of maximal consistent subsets of Γ and let Free(Γ) stand
for {A | A ∈ ∆, for each ∆ ∈ MCS(Γ)}. The three consequence relations are
defined by:
Definition 1 Γ `Free A iff Free(Γ) `CL A.
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Definition 2 Γ `Strong A iff ∆ `CL A for all ∆ ∈ MCS(Γ).
Definition 3 Γ `Weak A iff ∆ `CL A for some ∆ ∈ MCS(Γ).
The adaptive logics that we present here are based on CL◦ and will be
called CLr◦ (for the Reliability strategy), CL
m
◦ (for the Minimal Abnormality
strategy) and CLn◦ (for the Normal Selections strategy). We shall use CL
x
◦
when referring to properties that are common to all three logics.
As all adaptive logics, the logics CLx◦ are characterized by a triple: (i) a
lower limit logic LLL, (ii) a set of abnormalities Ω, characterized by a logical
form, and (iii) an adaptive strategy.
What all adaptive logics have in common is that they interpret a given set
of premises “as normal as possible”. What “normal” means depends on the
abnormalities.6 When a number of conditions are fulfilled, the adaptive logic
is in standard format. For adaptive logics in standard format, there are generic
proofs for all central meta-theoretic properties (see [1]). The conditions for an
adaptive logic to be in standard format are: (i) the LLL has to be reflexive,
transitive, monotonic, and compact and (ii) the strategy should be Reliability
or Minimal Abnormality. The logics CLr◦ and CL
m
◦ are in standard format, the
logic CLn◦ is not. However, as is shown in [20], every adaptive logic that has
Normal Selections as its strategy is characterized (under a certain translation)
by an adaptive logic in standard format.
The lower limit logic of all three systems is CL◦. We shall use L to refer to
the standard predicative language schema, and L◦ to refer to L extended with
◦; W andW◦ will refer to their respective sets of wffs. The members ofW◦ are
obtained by the usual formation rules, except that (∀α)A and (∃α)A are only
well-formed if A ∈ W and that iterated occurrences of the connective ◦ are not
allowed. We shall use Γ◦ to refer to {◦A | A ∈ Γ}.
The axiomatization of CL◦ is as for CL. The semantics is obtained in a
straightforward way from that for CL. Let M = 〈D, v〉 be a standard CL-
model, with D the domain and v the assignment function. The assignment v
of a CL◦-model is exactly like an assignment of a CL-model, except that the
latter is extended in such a way that also formulas of the form ◦A get a value
in {0, 1}. For formulas of the form ◦A, the valuation function vM determined
by a model M simply follows the assignment function. So, we add the clause:
vM (◦A) = 1 iff v(◦A) = 1.
All other clauses for the valuation function are as for CL.
We now turn to the set of abnormalities for our three logics and to the three
strategies. Consider the premise set Γ1 = {p, q,¬p ∨ ¬q, t ∧ ¬t}. In order to
find out what the free, strong and weak consequences of Γ1 are, we translate
the original premise set to Γ◦1 = {◦p, ◦q, ◦(¬p ∨ ¬q), ◦(t ∧ ¬t)}. The question
is now which premises of the form ◦A should not be interpreted as A. This is
obviously the case for ◦(t ∧ ¬t). The reason is that ¬(t ∧ ¬t) follows by CL◦
6Note that “normality” is used here as a technical term. It does not refer to formulas that
are considered false according to some standard of ‘good reasoning’ (CL, for instance), but
to formulas that may overrule inferences that are, in some application context, considered as
desirable but defeasible.
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from Γ◦1. This gives us immediately an idea of the kind of abnormality that
we are looking for. Abnormalities are formulas that overrule certain defeasible
inferences. In this case, we want to interpret ◦A as much as possible as A, but
we want to invalidate this inference when ◦A ∧ ¬A is derivable by CL◦. For
all three logics, abnormalities will be formulas of the form ◦A ∧ ¬A. So, the
set of abnormalities Ω of the systems CLx◦ is {◦A ∧ ¬A | A ∈ W}.
From what was said above, it may seem that in adaptive logics, abnormal-
ities are assumed to be false unless and until they are derivable by the LLL,
in our case CL◦. There is, however, a small complication. Consider, for in-
stance, ◦p. Although ◦p ∧ ¬p is not CL◦-derivable from Γ◦1, the disjunction
(◦p∧¬p)∨ (◦q ∧¬q)∨ (◦(¬p∨¬q)∧¬(¬p∨¬q)) is derivable. What this shows
is that p, q and ¬p ∨ ¬q are jointly incompatible. It is here that the adaptive
strategy comes in. In cases where a disjunction of abnormalities is derivable
by the LLL, but the separate disjuncts are not, the phrase “interpreting the
premises as normal as possible” becomes ambiguous. The adaptive strategy is
meant to disambiguate this phrase. What the three strategies come to is most
easily introduced by means of the semantics, to which we now turn.
5 The Semantics
For adaptive logics in standard format, the semantics is obtained by selecting
a subset of the models of the LLL that verify Γ. Intuitively, those models are
selected that, in view of the adaptive strategy, are as normal as possible. Note
especially that the intended selection can only be defined by referring to some
set of premises. Hence, it does not make sense to say that some model of the
LLL is an adaptive model. It only makes sense to say that it is an adaptive
model of the set of premises at issue.
For adaptive logics that are based on the Normal Selections strategy, the
selection requires a bit more explanation, but, as we shall see, is also quite
intuitive.
Let us start with some notations and definitions that we need to explain the
semantics of CLr◦ and CL
m
◦ . We shall use the term Dab-formula to refer to a
disjunction of abnormalities. In any subsequent expression of the form Dab(∆),
∆ is a finite subset of Ω and Dab(∆) is a disjunction of the members of ∆—in
practice we shall identify Dab(∆) with every disjunction of the members of ∆.
The Dab-formulas that are derivable by the LLL from the set of premises
Γ are called the Dab-consequences of Γ. Dab(∆) is called a minimal Dab-
consequence of Γ iff there is no ∆′ ⊂ ∆ such that Dab(∆′) is a Dab-consequence
of Γ.
Where M is a model of the LLL, the abnormal part of M is denoted by
Ab(M) and consists of all the abnormalities that are verified by M . Where
Dab(∆1), Dab(∆2), . . . are the minimal Dab-consequences of Γ, the set U(Γ) =
∆1 ∪∆2 ∪ . . . stands for the set of formulas that are unreliable with respect to
Γ.
For CLr◦, the semantic selection is determined by the following definitions:
Definition 4 A CL◦-model M of Γ is reliable iff Ab(M) ⊆ U(Γ).
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Definition 5 Γ CLr◦ A iff A is verified by all reliable models of Γ.
For the semantics of CLm◦ , we need the following definitions:
Definition 6 A CL◦-model of Γ is minimally abnormal iff there is no CL◦-
model M ′ of Γ such that Ab(M ′) ⊂ Ab(M).
Definition 7 Γ CL◦m A iff A is verified by all minimally abnormal models
of Γ.
Let us now turn to the semantics of CLn◦ , which is in a sense ‘derived’ from
the Minimal Abnormality strategy. In order to make this clear, we shall rely
on some further conventions and definitions.
A choice set of Σ = {∆1,∆2, . . .} is a set that contains an element out of
each member of Σ. A minimal choice set of Σ is a choice set of Σ of which
no proper subset is a choice set of Σ. Where Dab(∆1), Dab(∆2), . . . are the
minimal Dab-consequences of Γ, Φ(Γ) is the set of minimal choice sets of {∆1,
∆2, . . .}.
As was shown in [1], for every φ ∈ Φ(Γ), there is a minimally abnormal
model M such that M |= Γ and Ab(M) = φ, and vice versa. Evidently, this
does not exclude that there are LLL-models M and M ′ for which Ab(M) =
Ab(M ′) = φ. This raises the question which formulas are verified by all LLL-
models that share the same (minimally) abnormal part. Here are the precise
definitions for the semantics of CLn◦ :
Definition 8 A set M of CL◦-models of Γ is a normal selection iff, for some
φ ∈ Φ(Γ), M = {M |M |= Γ; Ab(M) = φ}.
Definition 9 Γ◦ CLn◦ A iff A is verified by every model of a normal selection
of CLm◦ of Γ
◦.
6 The Dynamic Proof Theory
The proof theory of adaptive logics is characterized by three rules (a premise
rule PREM, an unconditional rule RU, and a conditional rule RC) and a mark-
ing definition. The rules are the same for all logics, the marking definition
(which is determined by the adaptive strategy) is different.
The proofs themselves look like those of any other logic, except that every
line has a condition attached to it. As we shall see, the condition is introduced
by the rules and the marking definition acts upon it: whether a line is marked
or not depends on its condition. Formulas that occur on marked lines are no
longer considered as derived in the proof.
Where Γ is the set of premises, the inference rules for the logics CLx◦ are
given by:
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PREM If A ∈ Γ: . . . . . .
A ∅
RU If A1, . . . , An `CL◦ B: A1 ∆1
. . . . . .
An ∆n
B ∆1 ∪ . . . ∪∆n
RC If A1, . . . , An `CL◦ B ∨Dab(Θ) A1 ∆1
. . . . . .
An ∆n
B ∆1 ∪ . . . ∪∆n ∪Θ
The premise rule PREM simply states that, at any line of a proof, a premise
may be introduced on the empty condition. What the unconditional rule RU
comes to is that whenever A1, . . . , An `CL◦ B and A1, . . . , An occur in the
proof on the conditions ∆1, . . . ,∆n, then B may be added to the proof on the
condition ∆1 ∪ . . . ∪ ∆n. The conditional rule RC is analogous, except that
here a new condition is introduced.
Before we turn to the marking definitions, let us illustrate the inference rules
by means of the example. We shall use !A to refer to (◦A∧¬A). Suppose that
we are interested in finding out what the free, strong and weak consequences
are of Γ2 = {p, q,¬p∨¬q,¬p∨ r,¬q ∨ s, t∧¬t} and that we start a CLx◦ -proof
by first entering the premises of the ‘translated’ premise set:
1 ◦p PREM ∅
2 ◦q PREM ∅
3 ◦(¬p ∨ ¬q) PREM ∅
4 ◦(¬p ∨ r) PREM ∅
5 ◦(¬q ∨ s) PREM ∅
6 ◦(t ∧ ¬t) PREM ∅
Suppose that we would now continue the proof as follows:7
7 p 1; RC {!p}
8 q 2; RC {!q}
9 ¬p ∨ ¬q 3; RC {!(¬p ∨ ¬q)}
10 ¬p ∨ r 4; RC {!(¬p ∨ r)}
11 ¬q ∨ s 5; RC {!(¬q ∨ s)}
12 t ∧ ¬t 6; RC {!(t ∧ ¬t)}
The unconditional rule now allows us to add, for instance, also the following
lines:
13 p ∧ q 7,8; RU {!p, !q}
14 (p ∧ q) ∧ (¬p ∨ ¬q) 9,13; RU {!p, !q, !(¬p ∨ ¬q)}
7Remark that the applications of the RC-rule on lines 7–12 are justified in view of the
fact that ◦A `CL◦ A∨!A.
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15 r 7,10; RU {!p, !(¬p ∨ r)}
16 s 8,11; RU {!q, !(¬q ∨ s)}
17 r ∨ s 15; RU {!p, !(¬p ∨ r)}
18 r ∨ s 16; RU {!q, !(¬q ∨ s)}
At this point some readers might be worried that now some plain contradictions
are derived in the proof. However, as we shall immediately see, lines 12 and 14
are marked in the proof, according to all three strategies, as soon as the relevant
disjunctions of abnormalities are derived. Note that the same formula, namely
r ∨ s has been derived twice in the proof, but on a different condition. We
shall immediately see that, in adaptive proofs, deriving the same formula on a
different condition may make a difference for the marking.
We now set out to present the marking definitions. Dab(∆) is a minimal
Dab-formula at stage s of an adaptive proof iff Dab(∆) has been derived at
that stage on the condition ∅ whereas there is no ∆′ ⊂ ∆ for which Dab(∆′)
has been derived on the condition ∅. Consider a proof from Γ at stage s
and let Dab(∆1),Dab(∆2) . . . be the minimal Dab-formulas at that stage. Let
Us(Γ) = ∆1 ∪ ∆2 . . . and define Φs(Γ) as the set of minimal choice sets of
{∆1,∆2 . . .}.
Definition 10 Marking for Reliability: A line is marked at stage s iff, where
∆ is its condition, ∆ ∩ Us(Γ) 6= ∅.
Definition 11 Marking for Minimal Abnormality: A line on which A is de-
rived on the condition ∆ is marked at stage s iff (i) there is no φ ∈ Φs(Γ) such
that φ ∩∆ = ∅, or, for some φ ∈ Φs(Γ), there is no line on which A is derived
on a condition Θ for which φ ∩Θ = ∅.
This reads more easily: where A is derived on the condition ∆ on line l, line
l is unmarked at stage s iff (i) there is a φ ∈ Φs(Γ) for which φ ∩∆ = ∅ and
(ii) for every φ ∈ Φs(Γ), there is a line at which A is derived on a condition Θ
for which φ ∩Θ = ∅.
Definition 12 Marking for Normal Selections: Line l is marked at stage s iff,
where ∆ is its condition, Dab(∆) has been derived on the condition ∅ at stage
s.
If, at stage s of a proof from Γ, a formula A occurs on a line that is not
marked, then A is said to be derived from Γ at that stage of the proof. When-
ever a line is added to the proof, lines that were previously unmarked may be
marked and, except for the Normal Selections strategy, also vice versa. How-
ever, the notion of final derivability is independent of the way in which the
proof proceeds:
Definition 13 A is finally derived in a proof from Γ on line i of a proof at
finite stage s iff (i) A is the second element of line i, (ii) line i is not marked
at stage s, and (iii) every extension of the proof in which line i is marked may
be further extended in such a way that line i is unmarked.
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As may be expected, the derivability relation is defined with respect to final
derivability:
Definition 14 Γ `CLx◦ A (A is finally derivable from Γ) iff A is finally derived
in an CLx◦-proof from Γ.
Let us return to the proof we started above to illustrate the marking defini-
tions. This is what the proof looks like, for the different strategies, once the two
(minimal) disjunctions of abnormalities that are derivable from the premises
have been added to the proof—we do not repeat lines 1-6. Notations such as
R19 indicate that a line is marked, on the basis of the Reliability strategy, in
view of line 19.
7 p 1; RC {!p} R20, M20
8 q 2; RC {!q} R20, M20
9 ¬p ∨ ¬q 3; RC {!(¬p ∨ ¬q)} R20, M20
10 ¬p ∨ r 4; RC {!(¬p ∨ r)}
11 ¬q ∨ s 5; RC {!(¬q ∨ s)}
12 t ∧ ¬t 6; RC {!(t ∧ ¬t)} R19, M19, N19
13 p ∧ q 7,8; RU {!p, !q} R20, M20
14 (p ∧ q) ∧ (¬p ∨ ¬q) 9,13; RU {!p, !q !(¬p ∨ ¬q)} R20, M20, N20
15 r 7,10; RU {!p, !(¬p ∨ r)} R20, M20
16 s 8,11; RU {!q, !(¬q ∨ s)} R20, M20
17 r ∨ s 15; RU {!p, !(¬p ∨ r)} R20
18 r ∨ s 16; RU {!q, !(¬q ∨ s)} R20
19 !(t ∧ ¬t) 6; RU ∅
20 !p∨!q∨!(¬p ∨ ¬q) 1,2,3; RU ∅
The marking for Normal Selections is most easily checked. Only for lines 12
and 14, the disjunctions of the members of their respective conditions have
been unconditionally derived in the proof. For this simple example, it is also
easily seen that the formulas on lines 19 and 20 are the only minimal Dab-
consequences, and hence, that all formulas that occur on lines that are not
N-marked in the proof are finally derivable from the premises according to
CLn◦ .
Also the marking for Reliability is easy to check. All lines that contain one
or more members of U20(Γ
◦
2) = {!t∧¬t, !p, !q, !(¬p∨¬q)} in their condition are
R-marked.
For Minimal Abnormality, we need Φ20(Γ
◦
2) = {{!(t∧¬t), !p}, {!(t∧¬t), !q},
{!(t∧¬t), !(¬p∨¬q)}}. As an example: line 7 is M-marked, because there is no
line in the proof on which p is derived on a condition for which the intersection
with {!(t ∧ ¬t), !p} (one of the members of Φ20(Γ◦2)) is empty. Note that line
17 would be marked according to the Minimal Abnormality strategy, if line 18
would not be in the proof (and vice versa).8
8Adaptive proofs can be compared to Labelled Deductive Systems (LDSs, see [6]). The
conditions that are attached to lines are comparable to the labels in LDSs: both are passed
forward in subsequent derivations and both may encode additional information concerning
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7 Dynamic Proofs for Explorative Reasoning
In Section 3 we argued that the explorative reasoning style is quite natural for
some application contexts. In this section, we return to the example from that
section and show that the dynamic proofs of our adaptive logics are useful to
explicate this kind of reasoning. The reason for this is that they allow one, in
an easy way, to combine statements up to maximal consistency and to explore
the consequences that follow from those combinations.
We shall present a concrete example of a dynamic proof. Notations like !Px
will be used as shortcuts for (◦Px ∧ ¬Px), where 1 ≤ x ≤ 5, and where Px
stands for the corresponding statement (see P1–P5 from Section 3).
As no participant at the moment seems to outweigh one of the others, you
may for the moment accept all their statements as premises:
1 ◦K PREM ∅
2 ◦L PREM ∅
3 ◦¬(K ∧ L) PREM ∅
4 ◦((K ≡ R) ∧ ¬L) PREM ∅
5 ◦((L ≡ S) ∧ ¬K) PREM ∅
As you have clear preferences for hiring both Rose and Stephen, you may be
interested in trying to find out whether there is a “consistent subgroup” that
is in favour of hiring both these persons, and also whether some participants
are against hiring them. So, your reasoning could proceed as follows:
6 (K ≡ R) ∧ ¬L 4; RC {!P4}
7 K ≡ R 6; RU {!P4}
8 K 1; RC {!P1}
9 R 7,8; RU {!P4, !P1}
At this point, you can easily see from the condition that “Rose should be hired”
follows from the statements made by P1 and P4. As you see no immediate
contradictions between the statements made by P1 and P4, you may continue
to derive whether there is a consistent subgroup in favour of hiring Stephen:
10 (L ≡ S) ∧ ¬K 5; RC {!P5}
11 L ≡ S 10; RU {!P5}
12 L 2; RC {!P2}
13 S 11,12; RU {!P5, !P2}
The dynamic proofs also allow you to combine the statements derived on lines
9 and 13:
the argumentative path that was used in order to derive a formula. In LDSs the term
“flattening” has been used for procedures that decide which consistent set of formulas is
derivable irrespective of the given labels (similarly in the context of formal argumentation, see
[14]). Various flattening procedures provide different rationales how to deal with conflicting
arguments. In this sense, the adaptive strategies Minimal Abnormality and Reliability and
the corresponding marking definitions can be thought of as flattening procedures: given an
adaptive proof with annotated proof lines that may contain various conflicts, they determine
which formulas are to be deemed finally derivable. This way we gain a consequence relation
that does not anymore encode the conditions on which formulas were derived.
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14 R ∧ S 9,13; RU {!P4, !P1, !P5, !P2}
However, at this point you should be careful. As you can see from the condi-
tions, you are now relying on the statements by P1, P2, P4, and P5, and there
are some clear contradictions between their statements. So you better start
looking for minimal disjunctions of abnormalities. Suppose the first one you
derive is !P1∨!P5. At that moment, you are able to continue the proof in such
a way that line 14 is marked:
14 R ∧ S 9,13; RU {!P4, !P1, !P5, !P2} N16
15 !P1∨!P5 1,5; RU ∅
16 !P1∨!P5∨!P2∨!P4 15; RU ∅
As you clearly will have to make change P1 or P5 their minds, you may be
interested in whether they are forming consistent subgroups with other partic-
ipants and what follows from those with respect to Rose and Stephen. So, for
instance, you could proceed as follows
17 ¬L 6; RU {!P4}
18 ¬K 10; RU {!P5}
19 ¬R 18,7; RU {!P4, !P5}
20 ¬S 17,11; RU {!P4, !P5}
21 ¬S ∧ ¬R 19,20; RU {!P4, !P5}
We leave it to the reader to check that line 20 will never be marked in any
extension of the proof, and hence is finally derived in the proof.9
For this specific example, the strength of the dynamic proofs based on the
Normal Selections strategy is that they allow one to combine different premises
up to maximal consistency and to derive CL-consequences from them. They
also allow one, in one and the same proof, to make inferences from different
combinations, even if they are jointly inconsistent. When inferences are made
that are jointly inconsistent, the conditions enable one to keep track of the
premises they are derived from. Evidently, if the set of premises is incon-
sistent, some combinations will be inconsistent (and their CL-consequences
trival), but then the Normal Selections strategy ensures that lines that contain
such combinations (and all lines that are dependent on them) are marked as
soon as the disjunctions of the members of their respective conditions are un-
conditionally derived in the proof. Finally, the adaptive proofs for the weak
consequence allow one, in one and the same proof, to detect in an easy way
which premises are jointly incompatible with one another (by means of the
minimal Dab-formulas).
To sum up this section, the Normal Selections strategy differs from the
other adaptive strategies in an important respect: lines are only marked if the
abnormalities in their conditions are jointly incompatible. In the case of the
RM-consequences, this immediately implies that formulas that are jointly in-
consistent may be finally derived. In the above proof, all formulas on unmarked
9The only other two minimal Dab-formulas, besides the one on line 15, are !P2∨!P4 and
!P1∨!P2∨!P3.
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lines are finally derived (according to the Normal Selections strategy) in view
of the fact that it holds for all unmarked lines that, where {!A1, . . . , !An} is the
condition of the line, A1, . . . , An are jointly compatible.
8 In Conclusion
In recent years, we have seen an enormous multiplication of mechanisms and
logics for handling inconsistencies. Much less attention has been paid to the
question for which application context which kind of logic is best suited. In
this paper, we tried to address this question by distinguishing different styles
of reasoning. By way of illustration, we used consequence relations that are
based on the idea of maximal consistent subsets. We also showed that these
consequence relations can be reconstructed in a very simple way in the frame-
work of adaptive logics and that adaptive proofs are especially useful for the
style of reasoning which is most often referred to as “credulous” and that we
dubbed “explorative”.
APPENDIX
In this appendix, we prove that our reconstruction of the three RM-consequence
relations is adequate. We begin with some facts and lemmas concerning the
relation between maximal consistent subsets and minimally abnormal models.
1. Maximal Consistent Subsets and Minimally Abnormal Models
A set Γ is ω-complete iff whenever ∃αA(α) ∈ Γ, then also A(β) ∈ Γ for some
constant β. Θ is said to be a maximal consistent extension of Γ iff (i) Θ ⊇ Γ,
(ii) Θ is consistent, and (iii) for all Θ′ ⊃ Θ, Θ′ is not consistent. Let MCE(Γ)
denote the set of ω-complete, maximal consistent extensions of Γ.
The following are well-known facts in CL:
Fact 1 Where Γ ⊆ W is consistent: MCE(Γ) 6= ∅.
Fact 2 Where Γ ⊆ W and Γ 0CL A: there is a Λ ∈ MCE(Γ) such that A /∈ Λ.
Fact 3 Where Θ ⊆ Γ ⊆ W and Θ is consistent: there is a Λ ⊇ Θ such that
Λ ∈ MCS(Γ).
Definition 1 Where Γ ⊆ W and Λ ∈ MCE(∅) is any ω-complete, maximal
consistent set of formulas in W, we define the CL◦-model MΓΛ = 〈D, v〉 by
means of D = {{β | α = β ∈ Λ} | α is a constant} and the assignment v by
v(α) = {β | α = β ∈ Λ}
v(pi) = {〈v(α1), v(α2), . . . , v(αn)〉 | piα1α2 . . . αn ∈ Λ}
v(◦A) = 1 iff A ∈ Γ
v(p) = 1 iff p ∈ Λ and p is a propositional letter
18
Lemma 1 (i) MΓΛ |= Λ, (ii) MΓΛ |= Γ◦, (iii) MΓΛ |= ¬A for all A /∈ Λ.
Proof. (i), (ii) and (iii) follow immediately by the construction above and
CL-properties.
Corollary 1 Ab(MΓΛ) = {◦A ∧ ¬A | A ∈ Γ− Λ}.
Fact 4 Where Γ ⊆ W, Λ′ ∈ MCS(Γ), and Λ ∈ MCE(Λ′): Γ− Λ′ = Γ− Λ.
That Γ − Λ ⊆ Γ − Λ′ is immediate in view of Λ′ ⊆ Λ. Let A ∈ Γ − Λ′. Since
Λ′ ∈ MCS(Γ), Λ′ ∪ {A} is not consistent. Thus, A /∈ Λ and hence A ∈ Γ− Λ.
Lemma 2 Where Λ′ ∈ MCS(Γ) and Λ ∈ MCE(Λ′), MΓΛ ∈MCLm◦ (Γ◦).
Proof. Suppose there is a M ∈MCL◦(Γ◦) such that Ab(M) ⊂ Ab(MΓΛ). Hence,
by Corollary 1 and Fact 4 there is a A ∈ Γ−Λ′ for which M 6|= ◦A∧¬A. Since
M |= ◦A, M |= A. Due to the maximal consistency of Λ′, there is a B ∈ Λ′ such
that M 6|= B and hence M |= ¬B. But then ◦B ∧¬B ∈ Ab(M)−Ab(MΓΛ),—a
contradiction.
Corollary 2 For each ω-complete, maximal consistent extension Λ of some
maximal consistent subset of Γ there is a minimally abnormal CL◦-model of
Γ◦ such that (i) M |= Λ, and (ii) Ab(M) = {◦A ∧ ¬A | A ∈ Γ− Λ}.
Lemma 3 For each M ∈MCLm◦ (Γ◦), M |= Λ′ for some Λ′ ∈ MCS(Γ).
Proof. Assume M ∈ MCLm◦ (Γ◦) and M 6|= Ψ for all Ψ ∈ MCS(Γ). Let Θ ={A | M |= A} ∩ Γ. By Fact 3, there is a Λ′ ∈ MCS(Γ) such that Θ ⊂ Λ′. By
Fact 1, MCE(Λ′) 6= ∅. Take an arbitrary Λ ∈ MCE(Λ′). Since by Corollary 1
and Fact 4, (1) Ab(MΓΛ) = {◦A ∧ ¬A | A ∈ Γ − Λ′}, we have that (2) for any
A ∈ Λ′−Θ, ◦A∧¬A ∈ Ab(M)−Ab(MΓΛ) and (3) for all A ∈ Γ−Λ′, ◦A∧¬A ∈
Ab(M) ∩ Ab(MΓΛ). Altogether, by (1), (2), and (3), Ab(M) ⊃ Ab(MΓΛ),—a
contradiction.
Lemma 4 Where M ∈ MCLm◦ (Γ◦), Λ′ ∈ MCS(Γ) and Λ ∈ MCE(Λ′), M |= Λ′
iff Ab(M) = Ab(MΓΛ).
Proof. (⇒) Let M |= Λ′ for some Λ′ ∈ MCS(Γ). Since Λ′ ∈ MCS(Γ) there is
no A ∈ Γ − Λ′ such that M |= A. Thus, M |= ◦A ∧ ¬A for all A ∈ Γ − Λ′.
Hence, since by Corollary 1 and Fact 4 Ab(MΓΛ) = {◦A ∧ ¬A | A ∈ Γ − Λ′},
Ab(MΓΛ) ⊆ Ab(M). Since M ∈MCLm◦ (Γ◦), Ab(M) = Ab(MΓΛ).
(⇐) Let Ab(M) = Ab(MΓΛ). Assume there is a A ∈ Λ′ such that M 6|= A
and hence M |= ¬A. But then ◦A∧¬A ∈ Ab(M)−Ab(MΓΛ),—a contradiction.
Corollary 3 Each minimally abnormal model M of Γ◦ is such that there is a
maximal consistent subset Λ of Γ such that (i) M |= A for all A ∈ Λ, and (ii)
Ab(M) = {◦A ∧ ¬A | A ∈ Γ− Λ}.
2. Adaptive Reconstruction of the Strong Consequences
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Theorem 1 Γ `Strong A iff Γ◦ CLm◦ A.
Proof. (⇒) Let Λ `CL A for all Λ ∈ MCS(Γ). Let M ∈ MCLm◦ (Γ◦). By
Corollary 3, M |= Λ for some Λ ∈ MCS(Γ). Hence M |= A.
(⇐) Let Γ◦ CLm◦ A. Suppose there is a Λ′ ∈ MCS(Γ) such that Λ′ 0CL A.
By Fact 2, there is a Λ ∈ MCE(Λ′) such that A /∈ Λ. By Lemma 2, MΓΛ ∈
MCLm◦ (Γ◦) and MΓΛ |= Λ by Lemma 1,—a contradiction.
3. Adaptive Reconstruction of the Weak Consequences
Recall: Γ ALn A iff there is a M ∈ MALmΓ such that for all M ′ ∈ MALmΓ
such that Ab(M ′) = Ab(M), M ′ |= A.
Theorem 2 Γ `Weak A iff Γ◦ CLn◦ A.
Proof. (⇒) Let Λ′ `CL A for some Λ′ ∈ MCS(Γ). Let Λ ∈ MCE(Λ′). By
Lemma 2, MΓΛ ∈MCLm◦ (Γ◦) and by Lemma 1, MΓΛ |= Λ′. By Lemma 4, for all
M ∈ MCL◦(Γ◦) for which Ab(M) = Ab(MΓΛ), also M |= Λ′ and thus M |= A.
Hence, Γ◦ CLn◦ A.
(⇐) Let Γ◦ CLn◦ A. Suppose for all Λ′ ∈ MCS(Γ), Λ′ 0CL A. Hence, by
Fact 2, for each Λ′ ∈ MCS(Γ) there is a Λ ∈ MCE(Λ) such that A /∈ Λ. However,
for each such Λ there is, by Corollary 2, a M ∈ MCLm◦ (Γ◦) for which M |= Λ
and hence M 6|= A. By Corollary 3 this means that for each M ∈ MCLm◦ (Γ◦)
there is a M ′ ∈ MCL◦(Γ◦) such that Ab(M ′) = Ab(M) and M ′ 6|= A,—a
contradiction.
4. Adaptive Reconstruction of the Free Consequences
We first present some useful meta-theory that comes with the standard format
of adaptive logics.
Lemma 5 U(Γ) =
⋃
Φ(Γ)
Lemma 6 Φ(Γ) = {Ab(M) |M ∈MCLm◦ (Γ)}.
Theorem 3 Γ `CLr◦ A iff there is a ∆ ⊆ Ω − U(Γ) such that Γ `CL◦ A ∨
Dab(∆).
Lemma 7 A ∈ Γ−⋂MCS(Γ) iff ◦A ∧ ¬A ∈ U(Γ◦)
Proof. (⇐) Suppose A /∈ Γ − ⋂MCS(Γ). Let M be an arbitrary element of
MCLm◦ (Γ◦). By Corollary 3, Ab(M) = {◦B ∧ ¬B | B ∈ Γ − Λ} for some
Λ ∈ MCS(Γ). Hence, ◦A∧¬A /∈ Ab(M). Since M was arbitrary inMCLm◦ (Γ◦),
and by Lemma 6 and Lemma 5, ◦A ∧ ¬A /∈ U(Γ◦).
(⇒) Let A ∈ Γ−⋂MCS(Γ). Hence, there is a Λ′ ∈ MCS(Γ) such that A ∈
Γ−Λ′. Let Λ ∈ MCE(Λ′). By Lemma 2, MΓΛ ∈MCLm◦ (Γ◦) and by Corollary 1
and Fact 4, Ab(MΓΛ) = {◦B ∧ ¬B | B ∈ Γ− Λ′}. Hence, ◦A ∧ ¬A ∈ Ab(MΓΛ).
By Lemma 6 and Lemma 5, ◦A ∧ ¬A ∈ U(Γ◦).
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Lemma 8 For each Λ ∈ MCE(⋂MCS(Γ)) there is a reliable CL◦-model M of
Γ◦ such that (i) M |= Λ, and (ii) Ab(M) = {◦A ∧ ¬A | A ∈ Γ− Λ}.
Proof. Let Λ ∈ MCE(⋂MCS(Γ)). By Lemma 1, MΓΛ |= ⋂MCS(Γ). By Corol-
lary 1, Ab(MΓΛ) = {◦A ∧ ¬A | A ∈ Γ− Λ} ⊆ {◦A ∧ ¬A | A ∈ Γ−
⋂
MCS(Γ)}.
The latter set is by Lemma 7 identical to U(Γ◦). Hence, MΓΛ ∈MCLr◦(Γ◦).
Lemma 9 Each reliable model M of Γ◦ is such that M |= ⋂MCS(Γ).
Proof. Let M ∈ MCLr◦(Γ◦). Assume M 6|=
⋂
MCS(Γ). Hence, there is a
A ∈ ⋂MCS(Γ) such that ◦A ∧ ¬A ∈ Ab(M). This is a contradiction since by
Lemma 7, ◦A ∧ ¬A /∈ U(Γ◦).
Theorem 4 Γ `Free A iff Γ◦ CLr◦ A.
Proof. (⇒) Let A be a free consequence of Γ and hence ⋂MCS(Γ) `CL A. By
Lemma 9, for all M ∈MCLr◦(Γ◦), M |=
⋂
MCS(Γ). Hence Γ◦ CLr◦ A.
(⇐) Suppose Γ◦ `CLr◦ A. Assume
⋂
MCS(Γ) 0CL A. By Fact 2 there is a
Λ ∈ MCE(⋂MCS(Γ)) such that A /∈ Λ. By Lemma 8 there is a M ∈MCLr◦(Γ◦)
such that M |= Λ,—a contradiction.
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